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VOLUME 7 SPRING 1967 NUMBER 2
POLICE POWER, PLANNING AND
AESTHETICS
Theodore M. Norton*
Planning and zoning regulations are uniformly treated as an
exercise of the police power. Like a primitive taboo, however, there
is embedded in the law relating to such land-use controls a rule that
the police power cannot constitutionally be exerted for aesthetic
objectives alone.1 Like other relics of legal antiquity, this rule has
been qualified and distinguished, given only lip-service by most
courts and disregarded by a few. This paper demonstrates that there
is nothing in the concept of the police power as understood today
that requires the courts thus to discriminate against aesthetic regula-
tion and explores the scope of permissible aesthetic control measures.
The words "aesthetic" and "aesthetics" are used here in a
specialized, colloquial sense. According to the dictionaries, they refer
to the appreciation or criticism of the beautiful, the philosophy or
science of taste or of the perception of the beautiful. For planners
and land developers, however, aesthetic controls are regulations of
the external appearances of uses and structures. To a degree, ex-
ternal appearances are determined by functional and structural re-
quirements. The only control of appearances available here would
be to prohibit the use entirely or to require that it be masked or
screened, as by fences or planting. On the other hand, where the use
or structure itself can be laid out or built or decorated in a variety of
ways, rules can prescribe one kind of external appearance or arrange-
ment in preference to another. In either case these are the measures
planners and builders loosely call aesthetic controls. Behind most
such measures, presumably, lies some notion of taste or harmony, of
* BA., 1947, LL.B., 1949, Stanford University; M.A., 1955, Ph.D., 1960, Uni-
versity of Chicago; Associate Professor, San Jose State College; Chairman, Planning
Commission, City of Saratoga, California; member, California Bar. The opinions ex-pressed in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the City
of Saratoga, -California.
1 E.g., Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 Pac. 867 (1909).
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a desirable conformity or variety; however, their practical applica-
tion may represent but a rudimentary striving for the ideal of the
beautiful.
Today there is nothing in the concept of the police power that
makes it necessarily improper, invalid, unconstitutional to regulate
the external appearance of uses and structures. The correctness of
this statement can be demonstrated without reliance upon judicial
novelties. As Chief Justice Taney said in 1847, the police powers of
the states "are nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty .. ."' "It may be said in a general
way," wrote Mr. Justice Holmes in 1911, "that the police power
extends to all the great public needs .... It may be put forth in aid
of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare."
Neither of the cases just cited is a land-use or planning case.
The point is that their broad language neither says nor suggests that
regulations of aesthetic significance are in a different category from
other regulations of property and human activity. Nothing in the
language of the fourteenth amendment justifies any judicial discrimi-
nation against regulation of the exterior appearance of buildings as
against regulation of their interior arrangement under city building
codes. Logically, aesthetic controls should be entitled to the same
presumption of constitutionality, and the same judicial deference to
the legislative judgment, as any other law.
To say that there is nothing in the general principles of the
police power that forbids aesthetic regulation may be only negative
support for such measures, but more positive support can be shown.
The cases sustaining planning and zoning in general under the
police power implicitly, and sometimes expressly, recognize aesthetic
considerations as permissible police power objectives. Arguably all
planning and zoning legislation is fundamentally aesthetic in some
sense. By upholding planning and zoning in general, the courts have,
in effect, approved some measure of aesthetic regulation. Indeed, the
phrase "city planning" was first applied to the "city beautiful"
movement of the early 1900's. Whether or not all land-use regula-
tion is essentially aesthetic, it is obvious that the objectives of many
such measures are aesthetic, and the courts have recognized this from
the beginning.
An aesthetic element is, perhaps, most apparent in what is
called "bulk" zoning: the regulation of the size, shape and placement
2 License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 flow.) 504, 582 (1847).
3 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
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of buildings on the land. That the objectives of such controls are at
least in part aesthetic appears from the opinion in Gorieb v. Fox,4
where the United States Supreme Court upheld an early set-back
regulation. Mr. justice Sutherland noted among the reasons ad-
vanced in support of the ordinance "that front yards afford room for
lawns and trees, keep dwellings farther from the dust, noise and
fumes of the street, add to the attractiveness and comfort of a resi-
dential district, create a better home environment, and, by securing
a greater distance between houses on opposite sides of the street,
reduce the fire hazard. .... "'
"Use" zoning has also been treated by the courts as having an
aesthetic component. In State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Or-
leans,6 an ordinance prohibiting commercial uses in a residential
zone was upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court in an opinion that
emphasized health-and-safety and nuisance arguments but went on
to acknowledge, approvingly, the aesthetic significance of such mea-
sures. Said the court, "If by the term 'aesthetic considerations' is
meant a regard merely for outward appearances, for good taste in
the matter of the beauty of the neighborhood itself, we do not ob-
serve any substantial reason for saying that such a consideration is
not a matter of general welfare."'
Neither Gorieb nor Civello are recent, "new-hatched, un-
fledged" decisions. They rank among the classics of zoning law. The
latter was quoted at length in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,8 while the former relied on and confirmed the Euclid decision,
which it followed by only a few months.
The regulation challenged in State ex rel. Saveland Park Hold-
ing Corp. v. Wieland9 required a determination by village officials,
before issuance of a building permit, "that the exterior architectural
appeal and functional plan of the proposed structure" would not be
so at variance with those of the neighborhood "as to cause a substan-
tial depreciation of property values." The ordinance was held valid;
preservation of property values, the court said, is within the scope of
the police power.
Another conspicuous endorsement of amenities legislation came
4 274 U.S. 603 (1926).
5 Id. at 609.
6 154 La. 283, 97 So. 440 (1923).
7 Id. at -, 97 So. at 444.
8 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). In
Highway 100 Auto Wreckers v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 96 N.W.2d 85
(1959), the Wisconsin court remarked that in Saveland it had "declined to say that
a police power ordinance, in that case, zoning, may not be grounded on aesthetic
considerations alone." Id. at -, 96 N.W.2d at 92.
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a few years later, when New York's highest court had before it an
ordinance of the town of Rye prohibiting front-yard clotheslines.
The particular clotheslines were hung with rags as a protest against
high taxes, but even with this free-speech factor added, the Court of
Appeals upheld the ordinance. In the opinion, the question of a
plausible relationship between front-yard clotheslines and the public
health and safety was brushed aside, and the ordinance was sustained
"as an attempt to preserve the residential appearance of the city and
its property values."10
The property values rationale is not new, and has long been
used in support of comprehensive zoning in general. More than thirty
years ago, a distinguished member of the California bar wrote:
On analysis the primary objects of zoning are found to be, not so
much the protection of public health and safety, as the protection of
the value and usefulness of urban land, and the assurance of such
orderliness in municipal growth as will facilitate the execution of the
city plan and the economical provision of public services.
Zoning results chiefly from an appreciation of the "inter-de-
pendence of adjoining parcels of land" in urban centers; from a realiza-
tion that the value and usefulness of each parcel, not only to the
owner but to the community, is vitally affected by the use made of the
adjoining parcel. It is predicated upon a basic principle of urban land
economics, that a certain conformity in use stabilizes and insures the
value of land."
Nor is there any novelty in the proposition that the police power
extends to the general welfare, or rather that the general welfare is
an independent category of the police power, in addition to and
beyond health, safety and morals. In Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v.
Illinoiss,12 in 1906, the United States Supreme Court so held, and
with particular reference to measures for the economic advantage of
the community.
In the Saveland and Stover opinions, the respective courts rec-
ognized openly the relationship between aesthetics and economics
and based their approval of aesthetics legislation on that relationship.
It would be an exaggeration to say that the courts have now
ceased to discriminate against specifically aesthetic legislation. The
10 New York v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, -, 191 N.E.2d 272, 274 (1963), appeal
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). The opinion
also invokes the notion of a "visual nuisance" to support its conclusion. The nuisance
approach, which is an unnecessary complication at best, is criticized in Comment,
Zoning, Aesthetics and the First Amendment, 64 CoL.u. L. Rav. 81, 90 (1964).
11 Landels, Zoning-An Analysis of its Purposes and its Legal Sanctions, 17
A.B.A.J. 163, 165 (1931).
12 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
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opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker"
upheld the use of the eminent domain power for urban renewal in
the District of Columbia against an attack based on the due process
clause of the fifth amendment and a theory of the police power
limited almost literally to health-and-safety measures. Appellant's
argument was summarized by the Court: "To take for the purpose of
ridding the area of slums is one thing; it is quite another, the argu-
ment goes, to take a man's property merely to develop a better-
balanced, more attractive community." 4
Berman v. Parker, however, not only affirms a broad police
power in general, but specifically says that there is nothing unconsti-
tutional in using the police power to make a city more beautiful:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project
is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive .... The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature
to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not
for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. 15
While Berman is cited as authority in Saveland, Stover and
Oregon City v. Hartke,' it would seem to be more accurate to de-
scribe Berman not as a precedent in any strict sense for these deci-
sions but as an excuse to reconsider and re-work older legal doctrine.
In Saveland, the court, in discussing the effect of Berman v. Parker
on the traditional rule that land use controls could not be exercised
for aesthetic objectives alone, said it was now "extremely doubtful
that such prior rule is any longer the law."' 7
The most forthright opinion approving aesthetic considerations
alone as a legitimate basis for the exercise of the police power, is
that of the Oregon Supreme Court in Oregon City v. Hartke. Here
the city had made no provision in its zoning for automobile wreckers
and had prosecuted a "prior nonconforming" establishment for an
unauthorized extension of its premises. The question before the
court was "whether a city can wholly exclude a use of property on
the ground that the use is offensive to aesthetic sensibilities," and
13 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
14 Id. at 31.
15 Id. at 33.
16 240 Ore. 126, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
17 State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, -, 69
N.W.2d 217, 222 (1955).
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the answer was in the affirmative. 8 The opinion is written largely in
terms of the expansion of the police power and today's higher com-
munity standards, and is particularly significant in that its argument
is not based primarily on protection of property values. Furthermore,
although the automobile junk-yard is one of the classic examples of
the "visual nuisance," the court did not resort to a nuisance ratio-
nale.
In California, aesthetic controls are in a kind of limbo. Although
cities have provided for them, there is no controlling legal authority
either approving or denying their validity. The California courts,
however, have been generous to comprehensive planning and zoning
ever since Miller v. Board of Public Works,'9 and this generosity
has not been limited to general principles. "The development of
numerous procedural rules, including presumptions, rules as to bur-
dens of proof, rules of review and as to administrative finality," has
made successful challenge of land-use regulations increasingly more
difficult.2 °
In California the validity of aesthetic regulation of land use
is dependent on the scope of the police power. The authority of
California local governments to enact police-power measures is not
dependent on state enabling legislation. The California Constitution
provides that "any county, city, town or township may make and
enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary and other
regulations as are not in conflict with the general laws."', Under this
direct grant, California cities passed zoning measures before there
were any state zoning acts on the books.22 It is not significant, there-
fore, that neither the Planning and Zoning Act2" nor the Subdivision
Map Act24 authorizes aesthetic controls. So long as such controls
are not in conflict with state legislation, and they are not, cities and
counties are competent to prescribe them-if they are within the
scope of the police power.2
18 240 Ore. 126, 400 P.2d 255, 261 (1965).
19 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927).
20 Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes under the Police Power,
27 So. CAL. L. REV. 149, 150 (1954). See, e.g., Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal.
2d 95, 222 P.2d 439 (1950).
21 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11. For chartered cities, this language is supple-
mented by the "home rule" section that gives them exclusive legislative authority
"in respect to municipal affairs," CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8.
22 E.g., In re Hang Kie, 69 Cal. 149, 10 Pac. 827 (1886) ; Ex parte Quong Wo, 161
Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714 (1911).
23 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 65100-65907.
24 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11500-11641.
25 There should be no question of the state's having "pre-empted the field" as to
zoning, in view of the express declaration of legislative intent "to provide only a
minimum of limitation in order that counties and cities may exercise the maximum
degree of control over zoning matters" (CAL. Gov. CODE § 65800), and, as to subdivision
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Recent decisions have not narrowed the state supreme court's
declaration, more than thirty years ago, that "the police power is
no longer limited to measures designed to protect life, safety, health
and morals of the citizens, but extends to measures designed to
promote the public convenience and general prosperity."26 This lan-
guage is as broad as that of other courts that have upheld aesthetics
legislation. Nevertheless, the 1909 decision in Varney & Green v.
Williams27 inhibits any sweeping statement that aesthetic controls
are valid police-power regulations in California. Although never ex-
pressly overruled and still cited, Varney & Green has been qualified
and limited by subsequent decisions, and should not be a serious
obstacle to upholding aesthetic legislation.28
In Varney & Green v. Williams the controversy was occasioned
by the enactment of an ordinance, by what was then the town of East
San Jose, prohibiting signs other than those advertising goods and
services available on the premises where the sign was displayed.29
In striking down the ordinance the court said:
Such prohibition, involving a very substantial interference with the
rights of property, can be justified, if at all, only to the extent that the
subject-matter of the legislation is embraced within the police power of
the state. Bearing in mind that the ordinance does not purport to have
any relation to the protection of passers-by from injury by reason of
unsafe structures, to the diminution of the hazard of fire, or to the
prevention of immoral displays, we find that the one ground upon which
the town council may be thought to have acted is that the appearance of
bill-boards is, or may be, offensive to the sight of persons of refined
taste. That the promotion of aesthetic or artistic considerations is a
proper object of governmental care will probably not be disputed.
But so far as we are advised, it has never been held that these con-
siderations alone will justify, as an exercise of the police power, a
radical restriction of the right of an owner of property to use his
property in an ordinary and beneficial way....
... We are not here, however, concerned with the extent to which
the legislative power may in the effort to protect the public safety or
morals, regulate the manner of erecting or using bill-boards. The ordi-
nance in question does not attempt such regulation, but undertakes
control, in view of the express provisions for local implementation (e.g., CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 11506). Also, where CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8 (the "home rule" clause)
applies, even general state legislation would not limit the competence of a chartered
city. See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
26 Max Factor Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 461, 55 P.2d 177, 184 (1936).
27 155 Cal. 318, 100 Pac. 867 (1909).
28 Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power,
27 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 149, 150 (1954) ; National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey,
211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 27 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962).
29 Such a prohibition would appear to be valid today, at least if part of com-
prehensive zoning regulations. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 216 Cal. App. 2d
270, 30 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1963), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, 376 U.S. 186 (1964).
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absolutely to forbid the erection or maintenance of any bill-board for
advertising purposes. We have no doubt that this sweeping prohibition
was beyond the power of the town trustees.80
There was no reference to protection of property values, and there
is no evidence that the ordinance was accorded any presumption of
validity. Even under the orthodox rule of Varney & Green, legisla-
tion that serves aesthetic ends will be valid if it also serves some kind
of health-and-safety objective as well. There is nothing to the con-
trary in the Varney case, and, in general, the California courts seem
to have been as generous in this regard as have courts in other states.
In a case in which a San Francisco ordinance imposing a height limit
on buildings in the Marina district was challenged, the court said:
In our opinion there is no merit in appellants' further assertion
that the ordinance was enacted solely for aesthetic purposes. On the
contrary, the record shows that it was passed for safety, public con-
venience, comfort, general welfare, prevention of and spread of fire,
for the conservation of sunlight and air, the prevention of congestion
of streets due to overcrowding, as well as for aesthetic purposes.31
In most other respects as well, California seems to follow the
pattern of the rest of the country regarding aesthetic controls. Ac-
cepting Varney & Green as good law, a recent opinion of the Cali-
fornia Attorney General defends the questioned measure first in
terms of the public safety and then on the basis of the general wel-
fare, that is, community prosperity and the protection of property
values.82 The ruling in question was the decision of a city council to
require curved streets in a new subdivision. As presented, the ques-
tion assumed that the objective was aesthetic. Even if this was
assumed, the Attorney General reasoned, curved streets might also
contribute to traffic safety, by discouraging through traffic and fast
driving. Therefore, even if the primary objective was aesthetic, the
requirement was valid under the orthodox rule.
The opinion then goes on to declare that the requirement was
also supported by general welfare considerations:
Likewise, we believe that in many instances, the requirement that
a subdivider put in curved streets could be upheld on principles of the
"general welfare" of the citizens of the city. This would depend in the
main upon the character of surrounding neighborhoods and perhaps
master plans for city development. Though attractiveness is related to
aesthetics, it may likewise be related to the economic well-being of the
existing community. And, as pointed out, at least one appellate court
has recognized economic considerations in determining whether a police
regulation was reasonable .... Thus, where a city has been developing
80 155 Cal. at 320.
81 Brougher v. Board of Public Works, 107 Cal. App. 15, 23, 290 Pac. 140, 144
(1930).
82 43 CAL. Op. ATT' GEN. 89 (1964).
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highly attractive residential areas which include curved streets, it
would not seem unreasonable to require that future developments in
close proximity conform to like standards to stabilize or enhance
property values in the area.88
Further recognition of the close relationship of the economic
and aesthetic elements in land-use regulation appears in the opinion
in one of the recent sign-control cases. The aesthetics question having
been eliminated by stipulation, the court said obiter:
We, therefore, are not called upon to consider whether or not
certain early decisions in this state (which were written prior to the
need for, or adoption of, comprehensive zoning plans) would require
us to destroy the patterns sought to be created by local legislative
bodies acting upon reports and studies laboriously compiled by their
planning commissions. Today, economic and aesthetic considerations
together constitute the nearly inseparable warp and woof of the fabric
upon which the modern city must design its future.8 4
The net result is that even though the Varney case still fore-
closes regulation for aesthetic objectives simply, the other two op-
tions or approaches (health and safety, and general welfare and
property values) are available to the California lawyer who is called
upon to defend aesthetic controls. As a practical matter, there are
few such measures that counsel cannot justify on one ground or the
other, and often on both.
The limited scope allowed to anything labeled aesthetic regula-
tion is an exception, an anomaly. So far, the law reviews have shown
more enthusiasm than the courts for elimination of the anomaly. For
example, a 1956 law review note on the Berman and Saveland cases
stated: "It would seem that today esthetic zoning is a valid exercise
of the police power. '85 In another journal, in a full-dress treatment
of the problem that appeared just the year after Berman, the author
argued:
Zoning restrictions which implement a policy of neighborhood
amenity should be voided, if at all, not because they are for aesthetic
objectives but only because the restrictions are unreasonable devices
of implementing community policy. Whether, I repeat, an ordinance of
this type should be declared invalid should depend upon whether in the
particular institutional context the restriction was an arbitrary and
irrational method of achieving an attractive, efficiently functioning,
prosperous community-and not upon whether the objectives were
primarily aesthetic. (Emphasis in the original.) 80
38 Id. at 92.
84 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 216 Cal. App. 2d. 270, 273, 30 Cal. Rptr.
731, 734 (1963).
85 Note, Esthetic Zoning-The Trend of the Law, 7 W. Rs. L. RLv. 171, 178
(1956).
86 Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives-A Reappraisa, 20 LAW &
CoNTamp. PRO. 218, 231 (1955).
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And a 1964 note concludes:
Since regulations based solely on aesthetic considerations present no
greater danger of unreasonably stringent restrictions than other types of
social and economic regulations, and because legislatures are in a better
position than the courts to decide to what extent aesthetic controls are
necessary and desirable, there seems to be no good reason for treating
regulations based on aesthetic considerations differently than other
types of social and economic regulations. Thus, instead of imposing
limitations framed in terms of preserving property values or pro-
tecting the sensibilities of the average man, aesthetic regulations should
be voided only if they are unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. 3 7
Logic alone may not be enough to force state courts to re-
examine older precedents, even though demonstrably based upon
quite limited notions of the police power. That the courts still show
some reluctance to express blanket approval of regulations designed
to attain beauty simply for beauty's sake, does not mean that aes-
thetics legislation never or only rarely survives judicial scrutiny.
The fact is that many courts regularly found it possible to uphold such
measures long before Berman. By means of a modification of the
traditional rule a proviso was added to the effect that aesthetic
controls were permissible if the measure could somehow also be
found to serve health and safety objectives.
Such a proviso is a back-handed acknowledgment of the public
significance of aesthetics. Some of its applications might also be
criticized as at best unrealistic. It is generally said, for example, that
set-back lines requiring space between buildings advance the public
health by admitting light and air and serve the public safety by
limiting the spread of fire from one building to another. As abstract
statements, such arguments are not implausible, but as a description
of the actual objectives of most setback requirements, they apply
more accurately to the industrial slums of the nineteenth century
than to the modern suburban subdivision.38
It is not necessary to examine in detail all the varieties (un-
realistic and worse) of health-and-safety arguments solemnly ad-
vanced by counsel in defense of land-use controls serving ends
primarily aesthetic, and just as solemnly recited in judicial opinions
upholding such measures. It is enough to say here, that "this reason-
ing became a judicial formula which allowed many courts to attenu-
ate the rule against aesthetic legislation by finding dubious health
and safety considerations in regulations where aesthetic factors were
actually paramount." 9 Mr. Rodda's pre-Berman article summarized
the situation as follows:
37 Note, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 859, 867 (1964).
38 Landels, Zoning-An Analysis of its Purposes and its Legal Sanctions, 17
A.B.A.J. 163, 1.64 (1931).
39 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. at 862.
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Nominally, at least, the general rule today is the rule that aesthetic
factors may be considered and given weight but that such factors are not
in themselves sufficient. Few courts have directly stated a divergence
from this rule but, in terms of the aesthetic results which may be ac-
complished, there has been such a great expansion that the rule is now
largely a fiction. 40
Indeed, it has been so obvious that the courts are now giving
mere lip-service to the orthodox rule that Professor Dukeminier,
admonishing his readers that "it is not proper to conclude from
their language that courts do not know what is going on," seems to
suggest that the courts are consciously upholding aesthetic legisla-
tion behind a rather thin camouflage of health and safety verbiage.
Except in so far as the doctrine ensnares the unwary planner or
judge who puts excessive faith in the plain meaning of words, it does
not prevent any court from holding that community officials may zone
for aesthetic objectives. But it seems to me that the doctrine may
properly be criticized as meaningless theory, i.e., it does not describe
past court response nor enable one to predict future court response.
(Emphasis in the original.) 41
Notwithstanding such criticism, the fact remains that few
courts have expressly abandoned the verbal formula of the accepted
rule. What some courts have done is expressly to expand the terms
of the formula. As already noted, the actual holding in Saveland and
Stover appears to be that the police power extends to the protection
of property values, and that aesthetic controls are therefore consti-
tutional wherever they tend to preserve property values. Not only
is this expanded version of the formula more realistic, but estab-
lished police-power doctrine can be invoked in its support. Remem-
bering that even the standard nineteenth-century summary of police-
power objectives included "the general welfare," the formula now
reads that regulation for aesthetic purposes is valid when it also
serves the public health, safety or morals or, by advancing the
prosperity of the community and protecting property values, serves
the general welfare. The question remains whether courts generally
will go on, as the Oregon court did in Oregon City v. Hartke, to
recognize aesthetic regulation as valid without reference even to
property values. Professor Dukeminier suggests that the "general
40 Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes under the Police Power, 27
So. CAL. L. REV. 150 (1954).
41 Dukeminier, supra note 36, at 223. Some fairly recent fence cases demonstrate
the confusion possible. In two, where fences were prohibited, Texas and Tennessee
courts, each purporting to apply the orthodox rule, managed to reach opposite con-
clusions: City of Bellaire v. Lamkin, 317 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); City of
Norris v. Bradford, 321 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. 1959). In two, where fences were required,
the Appellate Department of the San Diego County Superior Court seems to have
reached inconsistent results: People v. Sevel, 120 Cal. App. 2d 907, 261 P.2d 359
(1953); People v. Dickenson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 872, 343 P.2d 809 (1959).
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welfare" category might be expanded still further, and would seem,
"to give the courts a ready-made word to use when and if they
openly recognize the aesthetic factor."42 In the Oregon City case, the
court said:
• * . there is a growing judicial recognition of the power of a city to
impose zoning restrictions which can be justified solely upon the ground
that they will tend to prevent or minimize discordant and unsightly
surroundings. This change in attitude is a reflection of the refinement
of our tastes and the growing appreciation of cultural values in a
maturing society. The change may be ascribed more directly to the judi-
cial expansion of the police power to include within the concept of
"general welfare" the enhancement of the citizen's cultural life.48
The reluctance of the courts to accept the logic of the general
police-power precedents, as expounded in the most recent aesthetics
decisions and in the law reviews reflects the difficulty of defining the
tasteful, the attractive, the beautiful. The courts cling to the old
formula as a means of maintaining some control over local officials
in an area where objective classifications and standards are particu-
larly difficult to establish. It should be noted that the Oregon City
case dealt with the relatively simple problem of exclusion of a use
unsightly by almost any standard and did not involve the drawing of
fine lines between different schools and styles of architecture. In view
of their acceptance of aesthetic legislation in practice, if not in
theory, courts generally would probably accept a new and more real-
istic formula if one could be devised. Protection of property values
has been suggested as such a formula,44 but this might still be un-
realistic and misleading in many cases. It is certainly something
less than complete and open acceptance of aesthetic regulation for
its own sake.
There must be some limiting verbal framework, sententious but
not too precise. The courts are reluctant to give local government
carte blanche to regulate the external appearances of buildings and
developments in any way a council, planning commission or other
agency sees fit. Whether phrased in terms of property rights, or of
opposition to coerced conformity, or of the liberty of the creative
individual to define and pursue beauty in his own terms, there are
valued freedoms involved. It may not always be a sufficient answer to
tell the non-conformist that his remedy is in the town meeting or at
the ballot box. The devotees of "modern" architecture, for instance,
even with the support of the architectural profession, are probably
42 Id. at 219 n.3.
48 Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 126, -, 400 P.2d 255, 261 (1965).
44 Zoning, Aesthetics and the First Amendment, 64 COLTYm. L. REV. 81, 90




a permanent minority, especially in a comfortable suburb. 5 How-
ever, neither personal nor property rights are absolute, and, as Mr.
Landels said of zoning in general, local government is expected to
protect its residents from "the blighting effect of non-conforming
uses," and from "'illegitimate and unfair non-conformity'.".4
Admitting that effective aesthetic controls will restrict individ-
ual freedom of choice and action, and recognizing that good taste and
aesthetic sensitivity cannot be guaranteed either for city officials or
for judges, the concern of the courts to structure or define the scope
and operation of such controls is understandable. The following is
offered as a possible approach. The kind of "visual attractiveness"
that would be constitutional for local government to enforce might
be defined in terms of the relationship between the external appear-
ance of a given use or structure and that of adjacent uses and struc-
tures. Beyond that, if there is anything desirable in the visual
character, actual or potential, of the community and its natural
setting, the appearance of the particular development could also be
judged in terms of its relationship to that of the community as a
whole and the surrounding landscape.
This relationship of exteriors or external appearances must not
be negative; how far should it be required to be positive? Where a
particular visual character is sanctified by history (Nantucket, New
Orleans, Santa Fe) a high degree of conformity might be enforced,47
but in many cases conformity might be too limited a goal. The word
"compatible" suggests itself. The dictionaries define it as "capable
of existing together without discord or disharmony," "accordant,
consistent, congruent ....." Incompatibility would cover depreciation
of property, but would not be limited to economic injury. The whole
of planning and zoning might be defined as bringing together com-
patible uses and structures and keeping the incompatible separate.
Aesthetic regulation is only a special case of land-use controls con-
cerned with compatibility of visual character, of external appear-
ances. It would be the responsibility of the local legislative body to
develop the "compatible relationship" formula for that community,
leaving it to the courts to strike down regulations for which no
rational basis could be shown.
45 "Modern" architecture received short shrift in Reid v. Architectural Bd. of
Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).
46 Landels, Zoning-An Analysis of its Purposes and its Legal Sanctions, 17
A.B.A.J. 163, 165 (1931).
47 Special "historic district" controls for Nantucket were approved in Opinion
of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); the Louisiana court upheld
such controls for the Vieux Carr6 of New Orleans in City of New Orleans v. Levy,
223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); similar controls in Santa F6 were held valid in
City of Santa F6 v. Gamble-skogme, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 289 P.2d 13 (1964).
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The difficulty of spelling out specific regulations in precise stat-
utory language is such that any serious attempt to impose aesthetic
controls will almost necessarily require some delegation of authority
to administrators. The problem of standards is not a matter merely
of a subjective judicial unwillingness to trust local agencies and
officials with too much discretion. Established constitutional princi-
ples require that standards be established to guide the exercise of
delegated powers in any field. The practical question is, how definite
and detailed must these standards be?
In the zoning field generally, as a New Jersey court phrased it,
"fairly broad and generally expressed standards suffice." 48 The cases
upholding architectural controls have not imposed any stricter rule
for aesthetics legislation. In Saveland, for instance, the ordinance
required that "exterior architectural appeal and the proposed plan
of structure" not be so different from that of the immediate neighbor-
hood "as to cause a substantial depreciation of property values of
said neighborhood." The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that this
language set a sufficient standard for the village authorities. 9 But
even the Wisconsin court has refused to accept as adequate a refer-
ence in general terms to health, safety, convenience, prosperity and
general welfare.5 0
Standards, apparently, need not be expressed in any particular
form or set out in any particular part of the enactment. In one case,
the court was satisfied with a recital of purposes. These included
maintenance of the high character of community development and
protection of real estate from impairment or destruction of value,
and were supported by a reference to architectural principles and
administered by a board composed of architects." In another Wis-
consin case even the preamble was resorted to for standards. 2
Regarding standards for the exercise of delegated powers, the
weight of California authority does not demand great detail or pre-
cision. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has said repeatedly
that a delegating statute may be valid even though no standards are
expressly prescribed. As early as 1907, in Ex parte McManus, the
48 Kirzenbaum v. Paulus, 57 N.J. Super. 80, 153 A.2d 847, 853 (1959).
49 State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, -, 69
N.W.2d 217, 223 (1955).
50 State ex rel. Humble Oil Co. v. Wahner, 25 Wis. 2d 1, 130 N.W.2d 304 (1964).
Some state courts are more suspicious of delegation in the area of aesthetics and in
zoning matters generally. See, e.g., City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey,
168 Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947) ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 544
(Fla. 1954).
51 Reid v. Architectural Board of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74
(1963).
52 Smith v. City of Brookfield, 272 Wis. 1, 74 N.W.2d 770 (1956).
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court stated: "It may not be presumed that the authority conferred
will be abused by the formulation of unreasonable or unjust rules,
and from such presumption declare the act to be unconstitutional.
On the contrary, the presumption is that the board will not act un-
reasonably or unfairly."53 In other words, general standards will
be implied, and the courts will interfere only where abuse of discre-
tion is alleged.54 In Roussey v. City of Burlingame an ordinance
required council approval of changes in the boundaries or descrip-
tions of lots within the city, but prescribed no standards for this
approval or disapproval. The District Court of Appeal applied the
majority rule and interpreted the ordinance as conferring, not power
to act "arbitrarily or whimsically," but "a legal discretion, the
power to grant or deny the petition in the honest exercise of a reason-
able discretion."55
The permissive attitude of the California courts in this matter
of standards undoubtedly makes it easier to draft legislation delegat-
ing regulatory powers, and this is true, presumably, of aesthetic
control measures. While it may be difficult to devise some fairly
definite standards for aesthetic regulation in some situations, it is
easiest to do so with reference to a specific community and particu-
larly to one that has some established visual character.
"Visual character" may be employed as a standard for archi-
tectural control if the community, in fact, has some identifiable
character. As was said in a 1960 law review article, "[t]he historic
preservation cases indicate that where architectural controls are
imposed on an area where exterior design is consistent and discern-
ible, the courts will construe the standards in their factual context
and find them sufficient if they are understandable."56 An ordinance
requiring advance approval of plans "in order to maintain the at-
mosphere" of the town was upheld where the necessary "factual
context" existed and was shown to the court by photographs.57 Where
53 151 Cal. 331, 336, 90 Pac. 702, 704 (1907).
54 The cases up to People v. Globe Milling Co., 211 Cal. 121, 296 Pac. 3 (1930) are
summed up in a note on that case in 19 CALIF. L. REV. 448 (1931). As indicated in
the note, there is a minority position in California, but the most recent state supreme
court decision is in accord with McManus and the California majority; In re Petersen,
51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P.2d 24 (1958). A recent decision supporting the minority view
is People v. Perez, 214 Cal. App. 2d 881, 29 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1963), but, as a decision
only of the Appellate Department of the Alameda County Superior Court, it hardly adds
much precedential weight to the minority view. Unfortunately it has been cited in at
least one standard treatise apparently as significant authority; 8 McQuIrLuI, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS 159, n.26 (3d ed., 1965 rev. vol.). It should be noted that the appellate
department of a California superior court reviews only decisions of the municipal
court in the county and does not hear appeals from its own trial departments.
55 100 Cal. App. 2d 321, 324, 223 P.2d 517, 519 (1950).
56 Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 26, 46 (1960).




a very small, half-developed community was a hodge-podge of styles
lacking any consistent character, however, the requirement that new
construction be "of early American or of other architectural style
conforming with the existing residential architecture and with the
rural surroundings" was held insufficient.5 8
In the fully-developed town, as Professor Anderson observed,
architectural review ordinances commonly seek to control excessive
dissimilarity; in a city of new subdivisions, prevention of excessive
similarity is the objective.59 Parenthetically, the "compatible rela-
tionship" formula suggested above would seem to cover both situa-
tions. But neither similarity nor dissimilarity offers a complete solu-
tion to the problems presented by a community that is at least
partially developed but lacks consistent character.
The larger and more complex the community, the more difficult
it will be to formulate standards for aesthetic controls. A simple
reference to "atmosphere" or even to "compatibility" will hardly
suffice for San Jose, much less Los Angeles. This is not to say, how-
ever, that aesthetic regulation is any less desirable or less necessary
in large and complex urban centers than in suburbs.
One answer for the city that lacks any over-all visual character
might be to try to create such a character not all at once but in
particular parts of the city as opportunity offers. An urban renewal
project, for instance, might be such an opportunity. A "cluster" or
"planned community" development, where architectural controls are
accepted by the developer as part of the special zoning treatment
involved, might be another. Given such a project or development as
a reference point, it would hardly seem unreasonable to require any
subsequent new construction on adjoining properties to be "com-
patible" in appearance. Such an approach implies some agreement
on general standards and objectives, and preparation and defense of
aesthetic controls would be facilitated by including visual character
in the city's planning. To quote Professor Anderson: "Certainly the
existence of a comprehensive plan for community appearance should
increase the likelihood of judicial approval of standards designed to
control architecture."6 ° Beauty may not be easily attainable, but
surely "it is not irrational for those who must live in a community
day by day to plan their physical surroundings in such a way that
unsightliness is minimized."'"
58 Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 63 (1959).
59 Anderson, supra note 56, at 30.
60 Id. at 48. A "visual survey" along the lines suggested in Williams, Urban
Aesthetics, PLANNINO (1953) at 56, might serve as the basis for such a plan. For new
approaches and vocabulary see, e.g., LYNcH, IMAGE OF THE CITY (1960).
61 Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 126, 400 P.2d 263 (1955).
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Of aesthetic regulation in general, McQuillin's well-known trea-
tise now acknowledges that "undoubtedly in this respect the law has
undergone a decided change in recent years,"62 and Mr. Yokley has
written that "with ever-increasing frequency, the courts lean more
favorably towards a consideration of esthetics as a major factor in
the enactment of zoning ordinances under the police power. "" At the
present time, the city that wishes to exercise some kind of aesthetic
control appears to have three options. The easiest, because estab-
lished in the cases, is to draft and justify the regulation in the tra-
ditional health and safety terms. Almost any such verbiage appar-
ently will serve as a sop to appease the judicial Cerberus, at least
where no broad delegation is involved. Secondly, the preservation of
property values has been given favorable consideration by the
courts lately as an acceptable basis for aesthetic controls. The
third approach is that of the non-judicial authors cited, who argue
that police power does extend to aesthetics, and that particular
justification, in terms of health and safety or property values, is
so much expendable verbosity. If the ordinance must be defended,
let it be defended in terms of aesthetics as a legitimate concern of
the community under the police power. This last approach is the
most satisfying intellectually, and hopefully the courts will continue
to progress toward its open recognition and support.
62 8 McQuiLiN', MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 75 (3d ed., 1965 rev. vol.).
63 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW & PRACTICE 28 (3d ed., 1965).
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